Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 11

11-1-1995

Vol. 16, no. 1, Fall 1995: Table of Contents
Northern Illinois University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Northern Illinois University Law Review (1995) "Vol. 16, no. 1, Fall 1995: Table of Contents," Northern
Illinois University Law Review: Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr/vol16/iss1/11

This Other/Newsletter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons.
For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Northern Illinois University

Law Review

Volume 16

Fall 1995

Number I

Articles
Francis X. Riley Lecture on Professionalism
George E. Bushnell, Jr . ..........................
Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and Public Service in Illinois
Joseph A. Dailing ................................
This article details the history of the provision of free legal services for the poor.
Advocates of the governmentally-funded Legal Service Corporations(LSC) have
encountered numerous obstacles and enduredferocious attacks from opponents. At
times it appearedthat the entire LSC program was in jeopardy. The author recounts
the establishment of the LSC program in Illinois, summarizes the LSC's many
accomplishments, and outlines the challenges that the Illinois legal community will
face in continuing to offer legal services to the impoverishedof our state.
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The Disparate Treatment of Student and Family Farmer
Debtors: Suggestions for Statutory Reform of Bankruptcy Policy
Nancy H. Kratzke and Thomas 0. Depperschmidt ........

25

Retroactive Taxation: United States v. CarltonThe Taxpayer Loses Again!
Ronald Z. Domsky ..............................

77

The resolution of bankruptcy litigation involving individuals under the governmental
student loan programsandfamily farmers under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code
provides an intriguing insight into congressionalpolicy. That divergence is especially
prominent in the treatment of "disposable income" under these two statutory
provisions. When deciding issues relatingto whether income should go to unsecured
creditors or be used to offset future farming costs, courts tend to interpret the Code
infavor of debtors; conversely, the Code creates,and courtsperpetuate through their
rulings, a clearpresumption againstdischargin8student loan obligations. The debtor
will prevail only if at "undue hardship" can be shown. This paper looks at these
'fresh start" differences by analyzing legislative history and case law and making
reconmendations, including suggested statutory revisions, in order to offer a more
balanced and equitable treatment of the two debtor groups.

Unlike criminal laws, the ex post facto constitutionalprotection does not extend to
civil tax matters. Nor are the words 'fairness"or "equity" found anywhere in the
Internal Revenue Code. Even as this is written, Congress is debating major tax
changes, some of which may be retroactive. Should taxpayers be required to plan
their financial affairs always subject to pending tax legislation or legislation that
hasn't even yet been proposed? The Carlton case is one of the most egregious
examples of taxpayer abuse in this area.

Vicarious Liability of an Employer-Master: Must There
Be a Right of Control?
John Dwight Ingram ..............................

93

Awareness of Meaning in Libel Law: An Interdisciplinary
Communication & Law Critique
Clay Calvert ....................................

Ill

The Public Figure Doctrine: A Reexamination of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., in Light of Lower Federal Court
Public Figure Formulations
Mark D. Walton ................................

141

Most courts impose vicarious liability on an alleged employer-master when it has a
right to control the physical conduct or method of doing tie work of tie person who
injures a third party. In other instances, courts impose vicarious liability in cases
where there only an appearance of actual control exists. This article examines the
difference between actual and apparent conitrol, and the author maintains that a better
test for vicarious liability is whether the injurer is acting on the employer-master's
behalf.

This article critiques, from a communication and law perspective, a proposal to add
another elemnent to the already complex calculus of constitutional libel law.. The
element-a subjective state of mind hurdle closely akin to the actual malice
standard-requires libel plaintiffs to prove that defendants were aware of the
defamatory meaning conveyed by their messages at the timne of publication. The
article suggests that while free speech and press interests under the First Amendment
may militate iiifavor of courts adopting this element, it: 1) conflicts with tie reality
of communication processes inherent in meaning determnination; 2) denigrates the
pivotal roles of the audience and miessage recipient in conimon law defamation; and
3) allows defendants who plead ignorance of meaning to escape liability despite
causing real reputational hariu to plaintiffs, jeopardizing the traditional goal of
defamation law.

This article focuses new attention oi the United States Supreme Court decision in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the seminal defamation case in which the Court sets out
the current testfor determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure. The
Courts of Appeals have differed in theirformiulations of the Gertz test, which in turn
has led to inconsistent application of the public figure doctrine. Through an
examination of the history of defamation law and amianalysis of recent lower court
public figure decisions, the author posits that the Gertz test is unlikely to ever be
universally applied.

Casenotes
Schiro v. Farley: If at First You Don't Succeed, Trial and Trial
Again; The Demise of the Double Jeopardy Clause Within the
Context of Capital Punishment
Patrick L. Edgerton ..............................

This note examies the United States Supreme Court decision allowing a trial judge
ii the sentencing phase to use as ali aggravating circumstance to impose tile death
penalty, an element of which the jumy was silent in the guilt or imocence phase. The
author contends that the majority's application of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
including the doctrines of collateral estoppel amid implied acquittal, was not only
erroneous but also inconsistent ii light of the Court's prior holdings treatig capital

175

cases as two trials: (1) guilt or innocence phase; and (2) sentencing phase. Focusing
on the "trial-like" nature of the sentencing phase in a capital trial, the author suggests
that the guilt or innocence phase and the sentencing phase should be treated as two
separate trials even absent a remand after appeal.

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Gender-Based Peremptory

Challenges on Trial
Stacey L. Wichterman .............................

209

Designing a "System for Idiots": An Analysis of the Impracticality
of Davis v. United States on Ambiguous Waivers of the Right
to the Presence of Counsel
William G. Worobec .............................

239

This note examines the United States Supreme Court decision holding that litigators
may not discriminate on the basis of gender during the process of selecting jurors in
that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. in addition
to discussing the history of peremptory challenges and jury selection, the author
proposes a limitation on the number of peremptory challenges allowed during jury
selection. In doing so, the author explains that peremptory challenges have
historically been a useful and integral part ofjury selection, but the process is now
a fertile ground for abuse. The author concludes that unless the legislative bodies
recognize the implications of the Court's holding and act accordingly, any fiaure
restrictions on peremptory challenges may mark the end of them.

This article explains the United States Supreme Court holding that police, upon a
suspect's equivocal reference to their Fifth Amnenibnent right to the presence of
counsel during interrogation, are no longer required to clarify the suspect's true
intent. The author contends the majority was erroneous il holding equivocal waivers
to be equivalent to clear waivers, and that the decision could not be reconciled with
Miranda and its progeny. The Court has impermissibly placed the burden of a
mastery of the law on the less knowledgeable suspect, and consideration need be
given to existing lower court proposals, or a modification thereof to preserve a
suspects' valuable Fifth Amendmnent right,

